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Co-creation of experiential qualities
Vuk Uskoković
University of California, San Francisco

Cognitive sciences have been interminably in search for a consistent philosophical
framework for the description of perceptual phenomena. Most of the frameworks in
usage today fall in-between the extremes of constructivism and objective realism.
However, whereas constructivist cognitive theories face difficulties when attempting
to explain the experiential commonality of different cognitive entities, objectivistic
theories fail in explaining the active role of the subject in the formation of
experiences. This paper undertakes to compare and eventually combine these two
major approaches to describing cognitive phenomena. It is argued that constructivist
explanations inevitably refer to a ‘hidden’ ontological source of experience, and that
a compromise between the constructivist and realistic standpoints presents a natural
basis for understanding cognitive phenomena. A view of all experiences as cocreated through an interplay between a constructivist creativity and a realistic source
of perceptual stimuli is proposed. A middle ground between the hardly compatible
constructivist and objectivistic approaches to experiential realities is proposed from
the standpoint of experiential co-creation. Traditionally divided, idealistic and
realistic philosophical stances may thus become merged into a single consistent
epistemological framework. Many favorable cognitive and psychosomatic
consequences may arise from acknowledging the balance between ‘inner’ and
‘outer’ creativity proposed by the co-creational thesis.

Keywords: Co-creation, cognition, constructivism, epistemology, experiential quality,
realism
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1. What are experiential qualities? A constructivist view

A question that sums up millennia of human wonder over the nature of our experiences
offers a neat starting point for our exploratory journey. To start off, we will go back to
John Locke’s Essay, where he proposed that all experiential qualities could be divided
into primary and secondary ones (Book II. Chapter VII. Paragraphs 9-10). Whereas
primary qualities were said not to depend on the observational perspective, secondary
qualities were conceived as subjective and incommensurable from the viewpoints of
different observational perspectives. For example, aesthetic forms discovered in the
shape, color, texture or sound of an object would correspond to its secondary qualities. Its
structural properties, e.g., atomic composition or crystalline order, would, however,
correspond to the object’s primary qualities. Both standard empiricism and the realistic
background of modern science are based on the idea that cognitive subjects are actively
involved in the definition of secondary qualities only. The primary ones are, in contrast,
considered as existing independently of human observers. Such an assumption is directly
related to objective realism, according to which the natural world leaves impressions on
cognitive

substrates

independently

of

their

interpretational

and

perceptual

presuppositions.
George Berkeley, however, extended Locke's ideas and arrived at the conclusion
that all natural relationships are de facto experientially observed ones, and that the
complete mathematical apparatus applied for representing and depicting natural qualities
can be derived from the human patterns of abstract reflections (Berkeley 1710). The
stream of experiential events does not uniquely predetermine, but simply 'invite' subjects
to compose the raw perceptive impulses into recognizable perceptual wholes and their
abstract representations. Despite the norms of neutrality and objectivity, scientific representations could, therefore, be regarded as inherently dependent on their experiential
origins. Causality, Cartesian coordinates, and all other logical and mathematical forms
used to represent physical phenomena are partly human inventions applied in the
coordination of our experiences. In that sense, Henri Poincaré observed that "geometrical
axioms are neither synthetic a priori intuitions nor experimental facts. They are
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conventions. Our choice, amongst all possible conventions, is guided by experimental
facts; but it remains free, and is only limited by the necessity of avoiding every
contradiction, and thus it is that postulates may remain rigorously true even when the
experimental laws which have determined their adoption are only approximate. In other
words, the axioms of geometry are only definitions in disguise” (Poincaré 1905). Albert
Einstein similarly held the opinion that "physical concepts are free creations of the human
mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world... the
object of all science, whether natural science or psychology, is to coordinate our
experiences and to bring them into a logical system" (Einstein and Infeld 1938: 297).
Development of this phenomenological and pragmatic perspective and its
continuous correlation with experimental observations from a cognitive science
viewpoint has culminated in constructivism (Foerster 1973; Maturana and Varela 1987;
Glanville 1990; Riegler 2001). The idea that experiential qualities are internally
constructed is the basis of the constructivist worldview. Constructivist theories of
cognition maintain that learning involves an assimilation of perceptual constancies in
terms of topographic similarities and temporal repetitions, and their fixation in forms of
objects and their qualities (Glasersfeld 1995: 154) – which lead to improving the
subject’s coordination of experience. Each creature can thus be considered as a
continuous creator of its own world of experience.
The constructivist models furthermore argue that one typically forgets this active
nature of perception after a certain stage in the cognitive development. Awareness of
continuous fixation of an unrepeatable stream of impressions fades away, and the objects
become seen as pregiven (Glanville 2003: 101). Although this implies an impression that
physical objects and their qualities are ‘real’, it is merely a cognitive illusion, since they
are, instead, argued to be unique, subjective and unrepeatable interpretations of an always
novel stream of information that ‘flows’ at the ontological basis of experiential
phenomena (Glasersfeld 1995: 63).
Constructivist views of perception differ from their objectivist counter-models by
granting an active role in the formation of elementary perceptions to the biological and
psychological nature of the subject. These views rely on the fact that the biology of
cognitive phenomena implies that the biophysical structure of an observer, along with the
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history of its structural coupling with the environment, has to be actively involved in
determining the qualities of external objects (Maturana 1990).
The biological nature of the observer is, however, not the only factor involved in
defining experiential qualities. Cognitive predispositions, including values, emotions,
anticipations, intentions, and aspirations can also be regarded as guiding the process of
selection of perceptual stimuli and their construction into meaningful wholes during the
formation of both a priori perceptual and a posteriori abstract impressions. Not only is it
considered that implicit values govern the interpretation of experiential phenomena by
imposing criteria of selection (during the accumulation of data and comparing logical
propositions and inferences), but they may be regarded as guiding the formation of
primary perceptions (Montuori 1993: 278). Such a view of perception has been correlated
with the fact that scientific and philosophical reasoning rests on implicit assumptions that
cannot be verified through experiments (Bröcker 2003: 54). Whereas Popper (1969: 5152) shared this view and claimed that "all observations are theoretically permeated: there
is no pure, disinterested, theory-free observing... our sensory organs embody that which
adds up to prejudices", Jean Piaget (1965: 212) held that "a profound synthesis between
beliefs and the conditions of knowledge is what we have named wisdom".
Since the subject is partly involved in defining the qualities of perceived physical
objects in accordance with his biological and cognitive predispositions and states, some
constructivist trains of thought go even as far as to claim that all seemingly objective
representations of the reality should be considered only as metaphors, whereas all
properties and qualities ascribed to experiential wholes should be, first and foremost,
considered as humanly derived attributes (Uskoković 2009b, 2010b). Human
assumptions about the nature of reality are thus reflected in the nature of scientific
models as much as in the features of our experiential realities.
The basic tenets and scholarly roots of the philosophy of constructivism were
mentioned in this section. In the following one, I will look at the basic flaws and
problems faced by philosophies of constructivism and objectivism and call for a middle
way between the two.
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2. Navigating the epistemological ships between the solipsist whirlpools of
constructivism and the inert streams of objectivism

Objectivism is a framework of thought in which experience is explained as essentially
observer-independent and entirely defined by the nature of the physical reality. The
conceptual and psychological flaws of objectivistic stances are numerous and have been
pointed out in various ways (Capra 1982; Maturana 1991; Laszlo 1996; Foerster 1998),
and will be only briefly mentioned here.
It is well known that Heisenberg’s (1969) uncertainty principle demonstrates how
an interaction with a measured system needs to take place prior to any detection thereof.
The nature of this interaction is, of course, specific for each being or device -- which
constitutes one of the basic problems that originate from the subjectivity of experiential
and natural phenomena in general. Consequently, the way in which we pose questions
predetermines the structure of the revealed answers; the way in which we look at the
world predetermines what we will see – consequences that follow from the core of the
constructivist viewpoint.
Living creatures react to environmental stimuli in accordance with their
biophysical structure (Maturana 1990: 302; Piaget 1965: 17). What humans observe as
qualities and objects, other animals would either not notice at all or perceptually
assimilate into thoroughly different cognitive schemes. However, as the biophysical
structure of each creature undergoes a continuous autopoietic process of self-generation
(Romesin 2002; Varela et al. 1991), and as such is unique at any given moment of its
existence, this leads to unrepeatable perceptions, data-compressing categorizations, and
abstract interpretations. Hence, even if it is assumed that the subject undergoes an
identical series of stimuli over time (which is, strictly speaking, a purely hypothetical
case), the resulting perceptions will always be novel and unique. The fact that always
novel neural patterns are activated in the brain upon performing approximately identical
tasks speaks in favor of this (Pribram 1971: 113). It is worth recalling that from the
objectivist perspective, the theory of relativity points to the relative character of
experience in relation to the physical conditions of the existential reality.
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The negative traits that objectivist assumptions leave on human reasoning and
social interactions were criticized on numerous occasions (Foerster and Poerksen 2002a;
Thyssen 2003; Maturana and Poerksen 2004). Neglecting the subjective character of all
critiques, judgments and measurements was said to lead to a social epidemic of intolerant
and manipulative attitudes (Kenny 2000:92). Disregarding the fact that phenomenological
intentions, anticipations and aspirations become reflected in the observational outcomes
has been hypothesized to lead to detached sense of responsibility for the state of the
world, as all the experiential details become seen as events that take place in a distant and
subject-independent surrounding (Bröcker 2004: 21). Each reference to external causality
in the explanation of physical phenomena can thus be translated as an implicit excuse that
"one is not responsible for the observed effects" (Glanville 1995: 316). Yet, suppressing
responsible decisions diminishes one's creative capabilities, limits the space for trust in
social interactions, and depletes one's inner sources of inspiration (Kordeš 2004: 76).
The objectivity with which one approaches analyses of experiential phenomena
can be partly blamed as analogous to blurring the distincion between maps and their
territories, and involves the necessary presence of language during the transmission of
knowledge. Linguistic analysis of experiential events presents a necessary aspect of
fruitful communication and mutual coordination of human experiences, which may be
taken to be a pragmatic definition of science as well as of any other creative human
endeavor (Winograd and Flores 1987: 12). However, its immanent flaws correspond to
the fixation of objects and their qualities into mapped symbols and operations of the
given formal system of reasoning. In order to provide conditions for an efficient
communication via language, the constancy of linguistic notions has to be ensured.
However, cognitive systems that make use of language are dynamic, in a constant process
of renewal and innovation (Maturana and Verden-Zöller 1996; Bunnell 2004; Cecchi et
al. 2004; Kondepudi and Prigogine 1998). In view of the contextually dependent nature
of physical qualities, there are no constant, fixed, and ultimate entities in the organization
of the world (Hiett 2001).
These problems entail each transfer of experiential knowledge into the
communicative domain of language. Maps must be composed of fixed entities, but it is
identifying these entities and the literal representations that they comprise not as modest
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and pragmatic metaphors, but as true and universal reflections of the natural order that
produces objectivistic flaws in our reasoning. Objective representations of natural
phenomena are primarily pragmatic signs that facilitate human-to-human communication.
At the same time, though, they provide conditions for diminishing the subjective sense of
responsibility by accepting the observer-independent observational attitudes and
erroneously identifying 'maps' with their 'territories'.
However, in applying one's efforts to cope with the 'streams' of objectivistic
attitudes that are insensitive to subjective experiential effects, there is always an
imminent threat of falling to the opposite side. Defined as a philosophical framework of
thought in which experience is described as actively constructed from within the subject,
constructivism occupies a complementary stance with respect to objectivism. It is,
however, dominated by potential solipsistic 'whirlpools' that are insensitive to productive
'streams' of experiential commonality. In that sense, one of the gurus of the constructivist
school, Heinz von Foerster (1979: 153), pointed out:
This is a peculiar delusion within our Western tradition, namely, ‘objectivity’:
‘The properties of the observer shall not enter the description of his observations’.
But I ask, how would it be possible to make a description in the first place if the
observer were not to have properties that allows for a description to be made?
Hence, the claim for objectivity is nonsense! One might be tempted to negate
‘objectivity’ and stipulate now ‘subjectivity’. But, remember that if a nonsensical
proposition is negated, the result is again a nonsensical proposition. However, the
nonsensicality of these propositions either in the affirmative or in their negation
cannot be seen in the conceptual framework in which these propositions have been
uttered.

Hence, by fighting the 'demons' of objectivism, there is a temptation that one will fall into
the abysses of solipsism, epitomized in the opening words of Schopenhauer (1840:1):
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The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every living
and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract
consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on him.
It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth,
but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around
him is there only as representation, in other words, only in reference to another
thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself.

Yet, owing to the blind spot effect and an inability to gain full insight into the nature of
one's cognitive assumptions (because they require an infinite chain of explications), an
observer is never able to see his true ‘eye that sees a sun’, as much as he is not able to
directly observe the ontological order of the world (D’Espagnat 1979: 32).
Whereas the uniqueness and individuality of experiences are a 'taboo' topic in
objectivistic frameworks, the existence of common and 'shareable' experiences are also
problematic for the solipsistic frameworks of reasoning. Thereupon, whereas the
objectivistic standpoints naturally instigate quests for 'self-identity', originality, and
specialness, the radical idealistic standpoints require an introduction of metaphysical
reasons that would account for the existence of common and compatible experiences.
Some of these metaphysical grounds invoked to overcome solipsistic “whirlpools” in
different explications of the constructivist standpoints have included the following: (a)the
principle of relativity according to which a scientific hypothesis is instantly refuted if it
becomes proven as invalid from two different cognitive perspectives, preventing
anarchistic “battles” between pure idealistic stances (Pakman 2003); (b) Kant’s
categorical imperative and identification of reality with togetherness (Foerster 1995a,b);
(c) an ethico-aesthetical imperative (Glanville 2001); and (d) the innate propensity of
biological creatures to, simply, love (Maturana and Varela 1987).
To sum up, constructivism per se faces difficulties concerning attempts to explain
the sources of compatibility of experiences of different subjects, whereas objectivism is
intolerant to the presence of subjective effects in scientific reasoning. Loking for a basis
for resolving the conflict between constructivism and objective realism, the next section
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explores a midway metaphysical worldview. In order to reach it, I will start from an
insight into the functioning principle of the eye, an example that illustrates the creativity
intrinsic to sensory organs. I will then show that it is in concert with the tenets of
constructivism.

3.The eye example
Many experiments have shown that the eyes and other sensory organs aren’t mere passive
tools that represent patterns of light or other environmental stimuli (e.g., Lettvin et al.
1968). Instead, they are actively involved in selecting the stimuli and in their reshaping
and adaptation to the cognitive needs of the subject (Winograd and Flores 1987;
Neugarten 2006).
Whereas ancient Greeks believed that the human eye throws light to the world
and thereby makes things visible (Park 1997: 34), the classical theories of vision are
based on the idea that external photons activate light-sensitive sensory cells and initiate
propagation of the corresponding signals from the optical nerve to the brain where an
image of the viewed object is formed (Edelman 1992: 19). These two views can be
merged into a single mechanism that more faithfully accounts for visual perception. The
classical theories of passive sight, which represent the human eye as analogous to a
photo-camera, are gradually being replaced by the theories of proactive sight (Findlay
and Gilchrist 2003), which acknowledge the key role of the sensory dynamics in
perceiving the world as we see it.
Environmental stimuli do not cause activations of neural networks before the
sensitivity threshold of the given sensory unit is exceeded. However, arrival of a useful
sensory signal at the visual cortex is conditioned not only by a finite level of illumination
on the visual receptors, but by modulations of the light, taking the form of perceptual
comparisons in the visual field.. Only receptors in contact with the boundary – such as a
variation in illumination or wavelength of light – will be able to produce a neural signal
and initiate a visual representation of the given stimulation (Foerster and Poerksen 2002b:
144). All sensors, artificial or natural, in fact, can detect only differences, which may
explain why Gregory Bateson defined information as "a difference that makes a
difference" (Bateson 1979: 17). Uniform flow of any stimuli provides imperceptible
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information unless it becomes modulated by either the action of the sensory organ itself
or by environmental effects.
For that reason, the human eye possesses a set of fine strategies that provide it
with the ability to detect even uniform signals from its surrounding. During a visual
observation, micronystagmic eye movements continually shift the position of the lightsensitive retina cells relative to the optical image in order to modulate the monotonous
signals that come from the environment and render them perceptible (Fischer and
Ramsperger 1984: 194). The scanning activity of the eye presents another means by
which the eye maximizes the information input. These subtle movements are a
consequence of the ability of sensory organs to detect only differences as information.
Only dynamic changes in perceptive stimuli can cause sensory perturbations and initiate
perceptual activities within the organism. Hence, both the physical surrounding and the
active perception of the subject are involved in defining and sustaining this dynamics.
Visual and other sensory representations do not present results of a passive impression of
environmental patterns upon a tabula rasa of one's mind. They are products of perceptual
processes through which the subject internally constructs viable representations of the
relations between the self and the environment.
The amount of information that an eye can perceive at any moment is so big that
it would cause a paralyzing confusion in the brain if it were detected in its entirety. As a
result, habitual recognition and a sketchy construction of visual objects from memory are
regularly carried out in advance to and aside from their perception in detail every time we
notice them. In fact, interpretation and compression of the 'perceived' data begin already
at the processing level of the optical nerve. Signals that arrive to the brain are, therefore,
redundant and already 'interpreted' to a certain extent (Fletcher 2001: 128). One such a
priori internal construction takes place constantly during our visual observations to make
up for the imperceptible blind spot which appears where the optical nerve leaves the
eyeball. With one such filling of this blind spot with what the brain assumes should be
seen there, the observer thinks that he does see what actually is there when, in fact, he
does not see that he does not see (Maturana and Varela 1987: 19). The awareness that we
would not see that we do not see unless we change the observation position is a profound
systemic

discovery.
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reveals

the

importance

of

including
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subjective/constructive aspects within all models of perception and cognition.
Furthermore, conscious shifts of attention between perceptible boundaries within one’s
visual field contain another subjective factor, for the fact that these shifts of attention and
gaze are essentially guided by our anticipations, habits, perceptual questions and,
ultimately, values. This suggests that seeing is equally actively seeking and
constructively drawing as much as passively finding and objectively detecting (Gibson
1986: 72).
Experienced telescopists and microscopists are aware that the results of their
measurements present intersections between the 'real' observed objects (although
invisible as such) and the aperture settings. Atomic force microscopy, one of the most
powerful techniques for the visualization of material structures on the atomic scale,
provides images that are not representing how the samples look like in reality, but are, in
fact, convolutions of the microscope tip shape and the surface morphology (Uskoković
2009a, 2010a). Distortions of the tip shape are correspondingly directly reflected in the
appearance of the observed particles. However, it is an inescapable fact that even under
perfect conditions rounded tips would naturally increase sphericity of the analyzed
entities, whereas the sharp ones would promote similarly sharp morphological features of
the observed particles. Another example may come from the traditional analyses in the
field of microbiology where a repertoire of stains is used to color specific cellular
compartments. Each stain thus reveals an aspect of the cellular anatomy that is invisible
when another stain is used (Harre 2003). Furthermore, high-resolution microscopic
histological analyses are normally preceded by sectioning, fixation, dehydration, wax
impregnation, and staining of the analyzed systems, resulting in sometimes significant
distortion of their properties of interest (Grimes and Aufderheide 1991: 5). In any case,
the micrographs obtained are not faithful images of the real structures, but rather artifacts
that reflect both the properties of the analyzed systems and the features of the measuring
devices and their settings.
It is, therefore, a rule that properties of the measuring instrument must be included
in the description of each experimental study. Likewise, products of our perception are
outcomes of the interplay between our properties as observers and the 'real' observed
systems; yet, we often forget to acknowledge the effect of our biological and cognitive
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properties as self-observers in crafting the appearance of the products of our perception.
Consequently, everything characterized as a quality in the world of one's experience
needs to be implicitly regarded as a way wherein the subject's cognitive foundations
present one 'co-creational' side, whereas features of the 'hidden reality' present another.
Perceived qualities do not point to a priori existing relationships and entities,
independent on the observer's epistemological bases. Instead, these qualities are results of
an active interaction between the observed system and the subject. Such an interaction
between mind and nature, during which qualities comprising one’s world of experience
are formed, I name ‘co-creation’ of experiential qualities.
All objects may be therefore considered as products of the dialogue between mind
and nature. They are threads that connect the 'hidden reality' of nature with the
epistemological core of the observer. Martin Buber noticed that "all actual life is
encounter " (Buber 1923: 63), which means that every experiential instant may be seen as
an encounter between the foundations of our being and the ‘hidden reality’. This is not far
from Hegel’s claim regarding the fundaments of the phenomenology of the mind: "The
universal divine man, the spiritual communion, has as its father its own proper action and
knowledge, while its mother is eternal Love, which it merely feels, but does not behold in
its consciousness as an actual immediate object" (Hegel 1807: 132). Statements such as
these may gather a new meaning in the light of the thesis of the co-creational nature of
experiences.

4. The relevance of both subjectivist and objectivist presumptions

In the previous section, I argued that all results of one’s perceptual and ‘representational’
activities emanate from a continuous co-creative ‘dialogue’ between the ‘hidden’
epistemological foundations on the subjective co-creative side, and the ‘hidden’
ontological foundations on the realistic co-creative side. Hence, no property from any
field of science or everyday reasoning could be defined without respect to both its
subjective and realistic aspects, which implies that both constructivism and objectivism
are relevant for forming a thorough epistemology. This is a classical systemic assertion
that can be evidenced on an endless number of examples.
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Should we try to define any human property, for example, we would realize that
none of them could be represented without taking into account the interaction between
the subject and its surrounding. Aesthetic impressions of worldly objects can be likewise
understood only as arising at the intersection between an experiential context that the
subject brings forth and the features that the object of contemplation can be attributed to.
If we endow an object or a being with a quality of goodness, it does not mean that
they are intrinsically good; it rather means that they are good in interaction with us as
observers as well as in comparison with other objects or beings of interest. Likewise, if
one notices that an object is firm, it does not mean that it is intrinsically firm. It means
that it is stable upon applying a mechanical pressure onto its surface. Because of the
relative nature of observation and definition of physical qualities, one assigns units
thereto and thereby implicitly compares the obtained values to a given standard. In
physics, hardness is defined in terms of pressure units. As such, it is related to the
humanly derived concepts of space, time and movement. However, it possesses a
scientific and practical meaning only relative to the hardness of other materials. In
mineralogy, hardness is measured on the Mohs scale where diamond is the hardest and
talc is the softest mineral. Any attribute ascribed to experiential wholes presents a result
of comparison with some preconceived referential norms. Therefore, it is both subjective
and objective references that need to be established in evaluation of the qualities of
objects.
In the world of physics, e.g., we can realize how, although it is a general rule that
the higher the wavelength of light the easier it penetrates the objects on its way, the
penetration depth of light could not be explained by referring to its frequency only. The
properties of the medium through which light travels are also important. It is, therefore,
the interaction between light and atoms and molecules of the medium that determines
whether the light will be reflected, absorbed or passed through.
In the world of medicine, we can notice how the quality of a material applied to
restore damaged tissues could not be defined without a reference to the area of its
application in the body (Uskoković et al. 2006). Specific material properties that prove
favorable in one context might turn out to be detrimental in another. The effective
application of each biomaterial critically depends on favorable feedback interaction
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between the living system and the material, during which both are subject to change. A
perfect hard tissue substitute is, for example, meant to be thoroughly absorbed by the
body in the course of regeneration of the tackled tissue, which implies a change of both
sides in interaction: the material and the body.
In the world of sports, the question whether swimmers should move faster in
chlorinated pools or in salty water would lead us to the same insight. In order to answer
this question, we need to take into account both the subjective and the objective factors.
That is, the emphasis needs to be placed on interaction, in this case between the swimmer
and the water. First of all, the swimming velocity of a swimmer would vary depending on
the density of the medium. For any particular swimmer, there is an optimal viscosity of
the swimming medium at which her speed would be maximal. But that is only the
objective aspect of our analysis. On the subjective side, we may notice how the human
body is subject to modifying its constitution depending on environmental and behavioral
requirements. Therefore, a swimmer moving through a lighter medium would gradually
develop a lighter body that would propel it quicker in that particular medium, whereas a
swimmer swimming only in a denser medium would develop a heavier constitution. This
discussion resembles the one over which athletes have wondered for a long time. Athletes
run faster and jump higher and farther at high altitudes where the air is less dense; on the
other hand, the lesser pressure and the lower amount of oxygen in the air if compared to
zero altitude poses limits on their performance (Uskoković 2009d).
The same type of reasoning can be applied to the question of whether it was
giraffes that developed long necks to reach the fruits of tall trees, or it was the trees that
grew tall to escape from the reach of the browsing giraffes and other terrestrial animals
(Uskoković 2008b). It is impossible to observe only one side of any interaction, because
it is imperceptible, just like the 'one-hand-clapping' from the famous Zen koan. Many
other co-evolutionary questions could be answered using the same type of circular,
feedback-permeated logic, bringing us to Wittgenstein’s guiding line, "In order to draw a
limit to thinking, we have to think both sides to this limit" (Wittgenstein 1918:
7/Preface), and to the acknowledgment that co-evolution of the system and its
environment is how the world – and we in it – evolve (Uskoković 2008a: 46).
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This characteristic of the evolution of physical systems in general leads to the use
of circular causality in describing them so as to overcome the logical paradoxes that arise
from their descriptions based on linear logic (McCulloch 1965:112; Bateson 1972:34;
Pask 1975:155). The main problem entailed by describing such feedback-based systems,
which include practically all cognitive systems owing to the default autopoietic
organization thereof, relates to unsolvable nonlinear equations that naturally arise out of
numerical attempts to model them. Linear representations of physical processes are
commonly, practically pervasively used in hard sciences, even though they contain
inherent flaws, which become particularly obvious when living systems are attempted to
be described by their means. Still, linearization of naturally nonlinear phenomena for the
sake of representing them as analytically solvable equations has become ubiquitous
practice in scientific simulations (Capra 1996: 79) Overall, he has pointed out inherent
flaws of it when it comes to its application in the description of biological entities.
However, he has mentioned as well that they are still commonly used because of
mathematical conveniences they introduce]. Yet, all physical systems follow the
principles of nonlinear logic in their evolution, as can be exemplified by recalling that
even Einstein’s famous equation ‘E = mc2’ was derived after omitting an infinite number
of its nonlinear terms in the process of its linearization (Kosko 1993: 278), as well as that
the linearity of quantum theory was adopted at the cost of introducing the infinitedimensional space, as each finite-dimensional nonlinear model can be routinely
transformed into an infinite-dimensional linear model (Esfeld 2004: 627). Finally, the
fact that there can be neither an ‘observer’ without an ‘observed’ (i.e., a perfectly
insightful observation of the cognitive bases of the subject’s worldviews) nor an
‘observed’ without an ‘observer’ (i.e., a perfectly objective insight into the nature of the
physical reality), as well as that each observation implies mutual transformations of both
the observer and the observed, implies that a cognitive subject’s attempts to comprehend
the co-created experiences may be regarded as a dizzying "application of an instrument of
analysis to analyze the instrument of analysis" (Maturana and Varela 1987: 141). Gödel’s
theorem has already pointed out that "if human mind would be simple enough to be
understood, then it would be too simple to understand it" (Fletcher 2001: 93), suggesting
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infinities arising ‘behind every corner’ upon our attempts to reach perfect models that
describe even the simplest physical systems, let alone our cognition.

5. Every quality is a way

The co-creational thesis can be described as the idea that every product of human
perception can be metaphorically depicted as drawn on the canvas of one’s mind
involving both the creativity of the subject and the creativity of nature in the act of
drawing. This thesis argues that both the biological and cognitive predispositions of the
subject and the external features of the physical reality determine how the world appears
as perceived through the subject’s senses, and as such occupies a middle ground with
respect to the worldviews of objective realism and constructivism.
Since each detail of one’s experiential world comprises both a common,
‘objective’ aspect that enables its ‘sharing’ with others, and a unique, personally
constructed side, we can consider every quality as a way, a connection between the
epistemological foundation of one's mind and the ontological foundation of the external
reality. An inseparable connectedness between the realistic and idealistic aspects of one’s
experience can also be postulated. Ultimate intrinsic qualities of objects, which would
correspond to Kant's things-in-themselves, cannot be known alone, and the same can be
said for the deepest cognitive patterns that guide our perception and reflections. They
become revealed only in conjunction with and reflection from its complementary cocreative side.
As we have seen in the previous section, although most of the actual scientific
representations, and particularly the popular ones, implicitly comprise a presumed
existence of an observer-independent reality, all seemingly intrinsic physical qualities,
such as energy or momentum, can be defined only in terms of their relations with the
postulated environments. For example, a particle is energetic only by reference to the
environment that it passes through (Uskoković 2008a). Its energy content is thus
inseparably related to its environment. The same principle of contextual definition of
qualities may be applied in any other domain of co-creation of experiential phenomena,
including biological, ecological, social, and cosmological. The fact that we have to refer
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to the realistic nature of the rest of the world in order to define the intrinsic qualities of
any natural system is consistent with the co-creative coalescence of subjective and
objective features in any conceivable experiential event.
Hence, from the realistic point of view, each system quality can be described as a
set of relations that constitute the system and yet figure in the interaction between the
system and its environment. These can be imagined as forming an ontological set of
relations with the object lying in its center. From the idealistic point of view, however,
each quality of a system corresponds to a harmony of relations that extend between a
perceptual representation of the system and the subject's interpretational context. These
relations can be viewed as constituting an epistemological set of relations with the subject
placed in its center. Along the intersection of these two sets of relations is the space
where the perceptual experiences arise, according to the co-creational thesis.
The ontological set corresponds to an infinite spectrum of relations through which
the observed system interacts with the rest of the universe. The epistemological set
corresponds to the observer's interpretational foundations and rational tools through
which she approaches the observation of the given system. Products of human perception
correspond to tiny areas of intersection between the sets of ontological and
epistemological relations that the observed systems and the observer engrain,
respectively.

6. Informations of the world as differences

Consideration of every experiential quality as a way, that is, a boundary between the
perceptually active subject and features of the environment is supported by the
aforementioned sensitivity of cognitive systems to differences solely.
The inner construction of perceptual wholes and abstract concepts is based on a
subjective absorption of perceptual impulses that firstly appear as differences at the
being/environment boundary. These primary differences instigate the subject to semiautonomously, i.e., in concert with environmental indications, construct perceptual and
abstract wholes that conform to the cognitive capacities of its biological structure.
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The realistic side of the co-creation of experiential qualities comprises
environmental differences that ‘invite’ cognitive systems to internally construct the
corresponding differences within their cognitive networks. In that sense, only impulses of
the environment that succeed in inducing a change in the structure of the cognitive being
can be considered as information (Bateson 1979). Information may be regarded not as an
objective quantity, but as a qualitative process of informing (Železnikar 1990), although
pervaded with potential ambiguities that arise out of its inherent subjective character. Yet,
comparison between at least a pair of perspectives may be regarded as the starting point
of each scientific and philosophical thread of thought, and incompatible descriptions of
the ‘same’ systems from different perspectives may provide these starting points for
branching of knowledge (Uskoković 2009c). For, only synthetic comparisons of
different, seemingly incompatible perspectives, may give rise to novel epistemological
concepts. In the aforementioned example of evaluating firmness of a pebble, it was a
comparison of one measured quality (i.e., structural integrity) before and after the
interaction with the measuring device that yielded another quality of the system (i.e.,
firmness). "Relationship is always a product of double description" as Gregory Bateson
(1979: 21) pointed out. Hence, it is not only that each representation of our experience
requires comparisons of perceptive and symbolic constancies. In order for any abstract
inference to be arrived at it becomes necessary to perform a comparison between at least
two logical propositions.
The fact that only contrasts, fluxes, changes, and differences could be sensed by
biological systems explains why on the realistic co-creational side everything potentially
observable presents qualitative emanations of relationships and processes, whereas on the
subjective co-creational side one needs to constantly change perspectives in order to be
able to notice subtle changes within frequently almost constant flows of environmental
stimuli as sources of information. Namely, "the unchanging is imperceptible unless we
are willing to move relative to it" (Bateson 1979: 89).
In order for anything to appear, a boundary that intersects a single entity or
perspective into two contrasting entities needs to be drawn (Baecker 2002: 56). To render
information perceptible, a boundary between two individually imperceptible areas must
be established. The consequences of each piece of information being a boundary that
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divides a given uniformity to an 'inside' and an 'outside' are clear: every knowledge
comprises a polar structure; every distinction and description implicitly point to the rest
of one's experiential context; every critique and declaration of goodness and viability
implicitly point to what is not good and viable, etc. As it acts as a link between particular
'insides' and 'outsides', each piece of information at the same time separates and connects
the respective poles. Hence, it could also be regarded as a way. For, each way represents
a path of simultaneous separateness and connectedness. The Way as a symbol can thus be
referred to as an epitome of this dialectical synthesis of mutual antipodes. The cocreational dichotomy between mind and nature undoubtedly reflects the same symbolism
of the Way (Uskoković 2009b).
The evolutionary progress is associated with the formation of ever subtler
differences at the being/environment interface (Malik 1995: 47). The evolution of human
knowledge likewise implies the process of differing within continual and uniform wholes,
and thereby resembles the role of 'Maxwell's demon' (Glanville 2003). "Draw a
distinction and a Universe comes into being" was the celebrated George Spencer-Brown's
(Brown 1969: 37) norm. In fact, the emergence of two from one has ever since presented
a miraculous natural event. The moments of the Big Bang, of the first division of a
fertilized egg cell, and of a hypothetical decision of a being living in a Schopenhauerian
world in which the environment perfectly mirrors that being's aspirations and desires, to
sacrifice its uniqueness and share the world with a co-creational 'partner', are examples
that concord with the Chuang-Tzu’s (400 BC: 71) co-creational observation: "If there
were no others, there would not be me either".
The fact that living creatures are able to perceive only differences may also
explain why abstract reflections are predisposed for analytical reasoning. Thinking
through which boundaries between both perceptive constancies and their abstract
representations become diversified during the development of one’s knowledge amounts
to a continuation of the child’s perceptual distinctions aimed at improving the
coordination of its experience. Yet, as the constructivist theories indicate, a child’s
construction of experience is based on the simultaneous application of diversifying
distinctions and synthetic assimilations of elementary experiences into wholes that
include objects and other beings (Piaget 1962: 43). Patterns composed of alternate
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differing and merging can thus be recognized as the elementary matrices of perception
and reasoning. The metaphor of the Way depicts such a simultaneous separateness and
unison, which is another reason for its meaningful application as a metaphor of the
thinking process.
The classical constructivist example in favor of this model for reasoning is the
one where the subject hears multiple dongs from a grandfather clock, and is free to decide
whether the clock struck the first hour multiple times or it struck an hour indicated by the
number of consecutive dongs (Glasersfeld 1995: 163). Similarly, the environment can be
said to provide stimuli that cognitive beings autonomously arrange into categories by
applying the operations of identifying and distinguishing. The basic concepts of scientific
reasoning, including Cartesian coordinates, time and mathematical operations are thus cocreated in the interaction between the environmental stimuli and the constructivist minds.
Mathematical abstractions as prototypes of conceptual patterns detached from the reallife experience may be, therefore, considered as founded on ‘realistic’ grounds as much
as on subjective ones. Explorations of the physical phenomena that are regularly
considered as detached from their subjective aspects may be, likewise, acknowledged as
co-creatively founded upon subjective and realistic grounds. As Erwin Schrödinger
(1944: 136) put it, "the world appears as one, and not as the world that exists and the
world that is observed. The subject and object cannot be separated… an object and its
image in the mirror are one and the same. The world extended in space and time is but
our representation". Indeed, the co-creational perceptive coalescence of the observer and
the observed prevents any attempts of non-arbitrary and ‘neutral’ distinguishing between
the two.
The co-creational nature of the construction of primary experiential qualities and
of their subsequent assimilation into perceptual and abstract wholes implies that the
subjectivization of one's mind in the early stages of life proceeds in parallel with a rise in
awareness that objects seemingly belong to an 'external' world. Qualities of the co-created
'external world' become seen as pregiven, despite the fact that they are semi-subjective
constructions. "All objects are indications of processes and symbols of the capability of
our neural systems to create stabilities and calculate invariances" (Poerksen 2003: 15),
Heinz von Foerster noticed. During a child's cognitive development, the relational
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character of objects and qualities gradually fades into cognitive background, whereas
assumptions of the existence of an objective world take over and become affirmed as the
basis for the coordination of experience. Nonetheless, there can be no subject/observer
without object/observed, nor vice versa. As Martin Buber (1923: 78) noticed, "it is not
the case that a child observes an object first and then sets itself in relation to it. The
tendency towards forming relations comes first". The co-creation of experiential qualities
implies that the subject simultaneously and interdependently establishes awareness of self
and of objects. Neglecting the co-creational links between the 'observer' and the
'observed' may lead to an illusion of alienated dwelling in a world that develops
independently of our deepest aspirations. As Martin Buber (Ibid.:102) further noticed, "If
culture ceases to be centered in living and perpetually renewing relational appearances,
then it hardens into It-world...then smooth causality, which did not have the power of
disrupting the spiritual conceptions of the Universe before, rises until it becomes an
oppressing, suffocating destiny".

7. "Two nodes and a change" as the mechanism of thought

Every description and every act of creation, as we see, imply a formation of polarities.
Every postulated relation necessarily comprises two end points. Consequently, in order to
define or observe any change, it becomes necessary to establish a relation between at
least two constancies. A change in the distance between two objects can be, for example,
observed only after their constancy in time is assumed. If one observes a shift in the
position of a star by comparing two photographs of a constellation, this would be based
on the assumption of a constant appearance of both the star and the constellation in the
background. Analogously, each described property is always drawn relative to some
implicitly presumed constancies. There can be neither absolute qualities nor absolute
skepticism and query. For, "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as fas as
doubting everything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty " (Wittgenstein
1951: 18).
The existence of two fixed end points and a change may be thus regarded as the
basic mechanism of thought. Such a nature of reasoning can also be represented by the
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metaphor of the Way, as well as by the music metaphor: like the simultaneous
separateness and connectedness symbolized by every way, acoustic oscillations arise by
two nodes alternately approaching and distancing each other. "Two nodes and a change"
as the fundamental strategy of human thinking reminds one of music played on guitar
strings. Scientific explanations ultimately rely on relationships, and many failed scientific
worldviews pertained to the adoption of certain qualities as single determinants of
physical properties, ranging from the single elemental theories of nature of ancient
Greeks to the phlogiston theory to the tenets of phrenology and many other theories
attempting to explain phenomena by invoking a ‘dormitive principle’ of a kind (Bateson
1972: 12). Despite this, the nature of human reasoning is such that an explanatory
principle (corresponding to fixing the nodes and thus enabling the strings of constructed
relationships to produce music) needs to be employed within each explanatory procedure.
Explanatory principles as the key points in formal systems of reasoning can only be
invoked, but never explained, particularly because they are used to explain everything
else (Bateson 1972). As such, they resemble the Sun, whose effects as a source of light
can be appreciated, but cannot be looked at directly.
The examples of explanatory principles in science may include 'gravity' in
classical mechanics, 'speed of light' in Einstein's theory of relativity, 'instinctual drives' in
psychoanalysis, and 'genetic code' in molecular biology. Philosophical examples may
include the concepts of 'will', 'absolute', 'a priori categories of understanding', 'monads',
and 'res cogitans' in the philosophical systems of Schopenhauer, Schelling, Kant, Leibniz,
and Descartes, respectively. In theology, the concepts of God, soul and the Holy Spirit
are 'explanatory principles' placed as the end points of one's inquiry within given systems
of reasoning. However, explanations based on single-variable models and unilateral
principles acontextually designed to account for all natural phenomena, regardless of the
other interactive side, are predestined to failure: “disagreements in philosophy are due to
exclusive emphasis on one member of any given dyad" (Buckham 1942: 412).

8. Harmonious cognitive and psychosomatic effects of the co-creational concept
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The co-creational thesis explains the origins of experiential qualities through a mutual
creative involvement of the subject and its environment. This implies that individual
experiential worlds cannot be considered as solipsistic 'inventions' independent on the
environmental content. They cannot be taken as objectivistic 'discoveries' independent on
the subject's cognitive foundations either. Instead, all the products of one's perception are
signs of a co-creational contact between the subject and its environment. The traditional
Western, objectivistic quests for the ‘treasures of life’ in external situations and
landscapes, independently of the epistemological settings of one’s self, can be therefore
seen as incomplete. However, the frequent Oriental tendencies to neglect anything but
enlightening the cognitive foundations of the subject can be seen as equally imperfect
(Witten and Rinpoche 1998: 117). This is so because, as dictated by the basic principle
of the co-creational thesis, the creative contribution in outlining the features of one’s
experience is always divided between its subjective and objective poles.
It is true that the constructivist aspect of the co-creational thesis implies that by
changing oneself from the inside, the world that one experiences changes as well,
because the subject is partly involved in creating his world of experience. However, this
construction of the world always proceeds in conjunction with environmental incentives.
The realistic aspect of the co-creational thesis, therefore, implies that the world as-it-is,
presumably existent from the constructivist point of view but treated as a Wittgenstenian
realm ‘whereof one cannot speak and must pass over in silence’ (Wittgenstein 1917: 97),
inevitably defines the subject and the way in which he perceives the reality. In other
words, the co-creational thesis tells us that as the human mind draws the features of
nature, while nature draws the features of the human mind, at every moment during their
co-evolving existence. As a result, one incessantly reflects nature in one’s reflections,
whereas everything comprising one’s experience is partly an invention of oneself. This
implies that we can recognize both our cognitive essence and the ontological foundations
of nature in every detail of the world of our experience.
The idea that the complexity of human cognition is reflected in the complexity of
experiential phenomena is supported by the fact that as research objects get closer to the
observer's mind – from astronomy, geology, and geography to anatomy, physiology, and
psychology (White 1949: 211 ) – the difficulties in describing the 'real' systems in
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question increase. It was thus proposed that accepting the mechanistic explanation of the
evolution of life would merely lead 'the enigmas of the Universe' to switch their place
with 'the enigmas of human cognition' (Koyré 1973: 89). On the other hand, accepting the
solipsistic idea that the Universe is nothing but a giant tautology would lead to an
opposite shift in the actual enigmas. Consequently, in quests for the paths of destiny one
would be conducted to the ancient prophecy of the oracle at Delphi: Know thyself'. But in
quests for the inner sources of harmony one would be led to hear the 'still small voice' of
nature behind the co-created experiences. Thereupon, natural laws can be said to be
neither passive objectivistic 'discoveries' nor solipsistic 'inventions'. They are higherorder products of the co-creational intersection of idealistic and realistic experiential
aspects.
From the co-creational perspective, each experiential detail can be regarded as a
‘sign’ that metaphorically points to the subject’s deepest values and aspirations. These
values and intentions comprise some of the deepest cognitive layers that affect the
experiential co-creation from the subjective side. But each experiential detail is also a
sign that points to the ontological origins of the observed objects, which comprise the
realistic content of the co-creation of experiential qualities. The ‘hidden’ character of
both co-creative sides justifies the use of metaphysical and theological metaphors in
representing experiential details as the products of communication between mind and
Nature. The ‘Eyes and the Sun’ of one’s experience may be regarded as metaphors for the
two creative sides involved in the emanation of experiences. In the aforementioned
example of the eye, we have seen how there is both light in the world and ‘light’ in the
eye. Intersections of these two ‘sources of light’, representing the domains of an objective
natural reality and a subjective epistemological core, respectively, giverise to every form
of experience. Explorations of the epistemological foundations in terms of observing the
reflections of the subject’s assumptions and aspirations on the state of his experiential
world represents one part of the co-creational adventure of the human mind. The quest
for the ‘guiding voice’ of nature that pervades the world as emanating from the
ontological foundations of the experience represents another side. Relating these two
sides may become regarded as the essence of metaphysical and theological studies. It is
highly probable that in the course of such a quest one will realize that discerning the
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reflections of one co-creative side implies an insight into reflections of the other. The
neo-Hegelian dialectical representation of the ontological nature of the world would thus
be confirmed (Weischedel 1966: 163; Ward 2003: 150).
Through embracing the co-creational nature of experiences, many cognitive
disharmonies could be overcome. The latter can be said to result from the subject’s
‘receding’ towards a single side involved in this balance. The symptoms of overly
approaching the side of ‘nature’ are observations of a predestined, mechanistic, and
observer-independent world. This makes us neglect the importance of improving the
foundations of our thinking. Extremely approaching the side of ‘mind’ alone, on the other
hand, makes us forget about the importance of comparing rational and emotional
perspectives with others, which results in the sense of isolation and egocentric
desperateness. Guided by the idea of the co-creation of experiential qualities, one is able
to find a compromise between living in harmony with the inner 'landscapes' of one's
reflections and yet living for the sake of enlightening others. One then self-responsibly
and sanely brings decisions from the core of one's being and yet incessantly looks after
"watching the world from the eyes of another" (Churchman 1968: 212). For, the most
creative expressions of ours is given rise to by empathically shifting our attention onto
needs of others, while the highest levels of empathy are attained by having our awareness
firmly rooted within the epistemological core of our being. Through this apparent
paradox, we realize that the creativity promoted by the constructivist elements of our
experience fosters the creativity exhibited by the realistic elements, and vice versa.
A fundamental consequence of the co-creational nature of the emergence of
experiential qualities is that epistemology and ontology, as much as constructivism and
objective realism, may become integrated into an interdependent and inseparable whole.
Therefore, if one seeks to unravel some of the natural mysteries, one has to know how
humans know, whereas if one seeks to know oneself, one must face the mysteries of
nature in one’s quests. Acknowledging the co-creational and partly subjective character
of the scientific practice, a large extent of the passive programmatic aspect of scientific
progress would cede place to more creative research attitudes, pervaded with a greater
ethical responsibility of the researchers. The way of science leads through humanistic
pathways, whereas real humanism cannot be separated from a pragmatic and rational
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inquiry about nature. Many contemporary scientific disciplines and theories, including
systems theory, theories of constructivism and autopoiesis, second-order cybernetics,
information theory, and theories of non-linear, dynamic and complex systems, inherently
consider the fundamental epistemological question: 'How do we know?' Owing to the cocreational coalescence of the observer and the observed at the perceptual and
interpretational levels of the observer's experience, an insight into this basic
epistemological question simultaneously opens the way for improving one's
understanding of natural realities. It is through deepening the basic epistemological
questions that one discovers the metaphorical and social character of science and
language (Uskoković 2009b).
Finally, besides their partially metaphoric character, a shared feature of science,
philosophy, and religion lies in their aiming at representing connections between the
invisible foundations of reality and the apparent experiential phenomena (Uskoković
2010b). The co-creational thesis built on the presumed dialogue between human mind
and nature and possessing both scientific support and theological meaning can be seen as
the metaphysical ground upon which science and religious thought can coexist in peace
and harmony. The co-creational nature of experiences can be used as a basis from which
the metaphoric, multiversal, and pragmatically co-orientational character of sciences,
religions, and other communicational endeavors can be derived.

9. Final words and a final gaze at the starry sky

So far we have seen that the idealistic aspect of the co-creational formation of
experiences implies that both perceptive and abstract elements of one's experience stem
from the subject's cognitive roots. However, the realistic character of the co-creation of
experiential qualities prevents us from being caught in the 'whirlpools' of solipsistic
worldviews that may follow from these idealistic assumptions. Extreme idealistic and
realistic standpoints, corresponding to pure solipsism and passive representationalism,
respectively, thus become merged into the dynamic subjective/objective balance of the
co-creational model.
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Accepting both realistic and idealistic origins of experiences might promote
subjects' responsibility for perceptive, abstract, and behavioral co-creations. The fact that
cognitive results of the biological activity of a single organism are neither completely
incompatible nor entirely identical with and reducible to experience of others supports the
realistic-idealistic middle Way adopted by the co-creational thesis. Our models of
experience, individual and scientific alike, can be therefore taken not as truthful, realistic,
and universal reflections of an objective world that is the same for all observers, but as
partly subjective and metaphorical in nature, a product of individual and social
imagination as much as an objective reflection of the world per se. In view of that,
products of our creativity, daily and scientific alike, serve the pragmatic purpose of
enlightening human experiences as much as of discovering the nature of the physical
reality, independently of us as subjects. The classical, objectivistic approach to studying
'natural' phenomena and the modern, constructivist approach to organizing 'experiential'
phenomena could thus be considered as complementary aspects of an ultimate general
framework for describing and managing experiential realities.
Reconciliation of seemingly contradictory approaches to explaining cognitive
phenomena, such as the one carried out in the scope of this work, has been a basic path of
progress of philosophical thought throughout its history (for an example, see Dascal and
Firt 2010). For example, Galilei believed that the Earth was moving and that the Sun was
still; Inquisitional premises were opposite – the Sun was moving and the Earth was still;
Newtonian astronomers, however, came to the conclusion that both the Earth and the Sun
were moving. However, from the relativistic framework, that is, by revisiting the
meaning of notions such as ‘rest’ and ‘motion’, all of these three astronomical
worldviews may be shown as equally ‘true’ (Whitehead 1925). The approach applied in
this work has dealt with one similar revisit of the metaphysical foundations of the
confronted models of objectivism and constructivism and might offer a key on how to
resolve many similar epistemological disputes. Other examples many include Kant’s
philosophy of transcendental idealism that united the philosophies of rationalism and
empiricism; merging of Huygens’ wave theory of light and Newton’s particle theory of
light within the quantum theory concept of wave-particle duality of all physical entities;
and topological geometry which united the concepts of Euclidean, metric geometry, and
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analytical, projective geometry. This brings us to the following Chuang-Tzu’s (400 BC)
observation: "Hundreds of doctrines march forward instead of turning backwards, and are
thus predestined never to conjoin… Yet, Tao is not choosing between this or that; it is
walking in togetherness with all of the streams". The middle Way approach, having
sprung forth from the ancient Taoist tradition, has been applied in this work too and can
hardly be expected to lose its timeless systemic relevancy in the future. For, as
expounded earlier, alternate diversifications and syntheses, which are implicitly ingrained
in the very concept of the Way, as it epitomizes simultaneous separateness and
connectedness, explain how knowledge evolves on all scales.
Simultaneous connectedness and separateness conveyed by the symbolism of the
Way and associated here with the nature of elementary experiences finds its meaning in
the domain of harmonious social interactions too. Namely, simultaneous introspective
withdrawnness, as in the spirit of constructivism, and compassionate sharing of
experiences, as in the spirit of objectivism, has been earlier invoked as the key to the art
of loving (Gibran 1923; Fromm 1956; Uskoković 2009d). However, finding a balance
between the self-responsible constructivist placing of the reference for one's ideas and
expressions at the core of one's being and the empathic 'realistic' devotion to observing
'the world from the eyes of another' is a hard task, although not an impossible one.
Enlightening actions responsibly refer to the cognitive core of one's being, but point
towards the beauty and significance of others. The drives behind the co-creation of
perceptual and reasoning patterns thus need to incessantly 'face' others (Buber 1923), and
yet originate from the core of one’s being. One’s creative being then becomes
reminiscent of a star: fusing cognitive impressions within the core of one’s being and
forming a creative energy thereby, which serves the sole purpose of bringing light to all
that surrounds one.
Finally, I will invite you to take a look at a starry sky and vaguely draw a
reference to von Glasersfeld's example of observing celestial constellations, which he
used as an illustration of the constructivist thesis (Glasersfeld 1998: 28). From the
constructivist point of view, the appearance of a specific constellation depends on
subjectively performed perceptual operations during the process of observing. From the
realistic point of view, the appearance of the constellation is also dependent on the
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objective viewpoint the observer occupies in relation to the celestial order of the universe.
Whereas the subjective aspect of the experiential co-creation implies that each specific
biological structure gives rise to unique experiential qualities, the realistic aspect implies
that each specific observational perspective further restricts the optional space of
perceptually constructible patterns.
Perception has been presented here as an active construction of subjectively stable
qualitative patterns in reference to which one can viably coordinate experiences. Then,
the subject's shifts of attention present a second-order element of the experiential
construction through which one organizes the primarily formed perceptive boundaries
into meaningful forms and objects of one’s experience. These shifts are determined by
the complete subject's history of inner processes and interactions with the environment.
They are also evidently guided by the subject's intentions, anticipations, aspirations and,
ultimately, values. By means of an active and dynamic redirection of attention along
perceptually available differences in the visual field, one constructs individual stars and
their celestial patterns. The primary perceptual qualities in terms of raw experiential
differences are thus being co-created at one level, whereas the interpretational
construction of the objects of one's experiential reality may be seen as arising at another
level. Both processes, however, involve the interplay between the subjective activity of
selecting and the previously co-created perceptive outlines that guide one's inner
processes of organization of experiences along the line of spontaneous perceptual
categorization and reflective thought. Every detail and aspect of one's experience may be,
therefore, regarded as a dialogue between mind and nature. Correspondingly, from an
idealistic standpoint the subject could consider every experiential detail as a reflection of
oneself, while from the complementary realistic standpoint the 'hidden reality' could be
seen instilled within every aspect of one's cognition and experience. The subject outlines
the starry patterns, and the starry patterns outline her being. Every detail of the subject's
experience presents a way that leads her to face not only the reflections of her own
understanding, but the reflections of the ontological essence of nature as well. “The stars
are beautiful because of a flower that cannot be seen” (Saint-Exupery 1946: 52), the
Little Prince said once. These words remind us that both the epistemological foundations
of our observations and reasoning and the ontological foundations of nature are the
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'hidden guides' of the subject's experiential organization. They are manifested in every
detail of the co-created experiential worlds. During their metaphysical dialogue, all
features of our experimental worlds come to light.

References
Baecker, D. 2002. "The joker in the box or the theory form of the system". Cybernetics
and Human Knowing 9 (1): 51 – 74.
Bateson, G. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
Bateson, G. 1979. Mind and Nature. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Berkeley, G. 1710. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.
Whitefish, MT: Kessinger.
Bröcker, M. 2003. "Between the lines: The part-of-the-world position of Heinz von
Foerster". Cybernetics and Human Knowing 10(2): 51 – 65.
Bröcker, M. 2004. "The part-of-the-world position of Heinz von Foerster". Brief
Strategic and Systemic Therapy European Review 1: 19 – 26.
Brown, G.S. 1969. Laws of Form. Portland, OR: Cognizer Press.
Buber, M. 1923. I and Thou. New York: Touchstone.
Buckham, J.W. 1942. "Idealism and realism: A suggested synthesis". The Journal of
Philosophy 39(15): 402 – 414.
Bunnell, P. 2004. "Changing the question". Cybernetics & Human Knowing 11(4): 5 –
10.
Capra, F. 1982. The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture. New York:
Bantam Books.
Capra, F. 1996. The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems. New
York: Anchor Books.
Cecchi, C., Vargas, A., Villagra, C., and Mpodozis, J. 2004. "Answering Cuvier: Notes
on the systemic/historic nature of living beings". Cybernetics & Human Knowing
11(4): 11 – 19.
Chuang-Tzu. 400 BC. Complete Works. New York: Columbia University Press.

31
Dascal, M. and Firt, E. 2010. “Leibniz’s conciliatory approaches in scientific
controversies”. In M. Dascal (ed), The Practice of Reason: Leibniz and his
controversies. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 137-167.

D’Espagnat, B. 1979. In Search of Reality. New York: Springer.
Edelman, G. 1992. Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. New York: Basic Books.
Einstein, A. and Infeld, L. 1938. The Evolution of Physics. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Esfeld, M. 2004. "Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations". Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35: 625 – 41.
Findlay, J.M. and Gilchrist, I.D. 2003. Active Vision: The Psychology of Looking and
Seeing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, B. and Ramsperger, E. 1984. "Human express saccades: Extremely short
reaction times of goal directed eye movements". Experiments in Brain Research 57:
191–195.
Fletcher, A. 2001. The Art of Looking Sideways. London: Phaidon.
Foerster, H.V. 1973. Observing Systems (Systems Inquiry Series): On Constructing a
Reality. Salinas, CA: Intersystems Publications.
Foerster, H.V. 1979. Cybernetics of Cybernetics. Cedar Rapids, IA: Future Systems, Inc.
Foerster, H.V. 1995a. "Ethics and second-order cybernetics". Stanford Humanities
Review 4(2): 1 - 15.
Foerster, H.V. 1995b. "Metaphysics of an experimental epistemologist". In R. MorenoDiaz and J. Mira-Mira (eds), Brain Processes, Theories and Models. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, pp. 426 - 437.
Foerster, H.V. 1998. "On constructing a reality". In L. Woods and E. Rehfeld (eds),
Vienna: Borderline/Springer, pp. 78 - 94.
Foerster, H.V. and Poerksen, B. 2002a. "The metaphysics of ethics: A conversation".
Cybernetics and Human Knowing 9(3-4): 149 – 157.
Foerster, H.V. and Poerksen, B. 2002b. "Understanding systems: Conversations on
epistemology and ethics". IFSR International Series on Systems Science and
Engineering. Berlin: Springer, pp. 140 – 146.

32
Fromm, E. 1956. The Art of Loving. Zagreb: Naprijed.
Gibran, K. 1923. The Prophet. New York:Alfred A. Knopf.
Gibson, J.J. 1986. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. London: Psychology
Press.
Glanville, R. 1990. The Self and the other: The purpose of distinction". In R. Trappl (ed),
Cybernetics and Systems. Singapore: World Scientific, pp. 188 - 195.
Glanville, R. 1995. "Chasing the blame". In G. Lasker (ed), Research on Progress –
Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies on Systems Research and Cybernetics 11,
Windsor, ON: International Sustainable Systems Research Center, pp. 312 – 320.
Glanville, R. 2001. "An observing science". Foundations of Science 6(1-3): 45 – 75.
Glanville, R. 2003. "Machines of wonder and elephants that float through air".
Cybernetics & Human Knowing 10(3-4): 91 – 105.
Glasersfeld, E.V. 1995.Radical Constructivism. London: RoutledgeFalmer.
Glasersfeld, E.V. 1998. "Radical constructivism and teaching". Presented at the 15th
Advanced Course. Geneva: Archives Jean Piaget, pp. 21 - 30.
Glasersfeld, E.V. 2001. "The radical constructivist view of science". Foundations of
Science 6 (1-3) 31 – 43.
Grimes, G.W. and Aufderheide, K.J. 1991. Cellular Aspects of Pattern Formation: The
Problem of Assembly. Basel: Karger.
Harré, R. 2003. "Foreword". In J.E. Earley, Sr. (ed), Chemical Explanation:
Characteristics, Development, Autonomy. New York: New York Academy of
Sciences, pp. i - xii.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1807. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by J. B. Baillie. New York:
Dover.
Heisenberg, W. 1969. Physics and Metaphysics. Belgrade: Nolit.
Hiett, P.J. 2001. "The contradiction at the heart of complexity science". Emergence 3(3):
108 – 120.
Kenny, V. 2000. "On the backwards epistemology of misguided psychotherapists". In E.
Deriu (ed), Gregory Bateson. Milano: Bruno Mondadori, pp. 72 - 96.
Kondepudi, D. and Prigogine I. 1998. Modern Thermodynamics: From Heat Engines to
Dissipative Structures. New York: Wiley.

33
Kordeš, U. 2004. From Truth to Trust. Ljubljana: Studia Humanitatis.
Kosko, B. 1993. Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science of Fuzzy Logic. London: Flamingo.
Koyré, A. 1973. Scientific Revolution. Belgrade: Nolit.
Laszlo, E. 1996. The Systems View of the World: A Holistic Vision for Our Time.
Cresskill NJ: Hampton Press.
Lettvin, J.Y., Maturana, H.R., McCulloch, W.S., and Pitts W.H. 1968. "What the frog's
eye tells the frog's brain. In W.C. Corning and M. Balaban (eds), The Mind:
Biological Approaches to its Functions. New York: Wiley, pp. 61 - 70.
Locke, J. 1690. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Amherst, NY: Prometheus
Books.
Malik, S.C. 1995. "Holistic science and consciousness". In B. Saraswati (ed), Man in
Nature. New Delhi: DK Print World, pp. 46 - 58.
Maturana, H.R and Francisco, V. 1987. The Tree of Knowledge. Boston, MA:
Shambhala.
Maturana, H.R. 1990. "Ontology of observing. The biological foundations of self
consciousness and the physical domain of existence". In N. Luhmann (ed),
Beobacheter: Konvergenz der Erkenntnistheorien?. München: Wilhem Fink Verlag,
pp. 284 – 340.
Maturana, H.R. 1991. "Reality: The search for objectivity, or the quest for a compelling
argument". In N. Leser, J. Serfert, and K. Plitzner. (eds), Die Gedankenwelt Sir Karl
Poppers. Kritischer Rationalismus in Dialog. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitats
Verlag, pp. 12 - 36.
Maturana, H.R. and Poerksen B. 2004. "Varieties of objectivity". Cybernetics and
Human Knowing 11(4): 63 – 71.
Maturana, H.R and Verden-Zöller, G. 1996. "Biology of love". In G. Opp and F.
Peterander (eds), Focus Heilpaedagogik. München: Ernst Reinhardt, pp. 74 - 101.
McCulloch, W. 1965. Embodiments of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Montuori, A. 1993. "Knowledge, learning, and change". In T. Tulku (ed), Mastery of
Mind. Berkeley, CA: Dharma Press, pp. 252 - 298.

34
Neugarten, M.L. 2006. "Foresight – Are we looking in the right direction?". Futures
38(8): 894 – 907.
Pakman, M. 2003. "Elements for a Foersterian poetics in psychotherapeutic practice".
Cybernetics & Human Knowing 10(3-4):107 – 123.
Park, D. 1997. The Fire Within the Eye. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pask, G. 1975. Conversation, Cognition and Learning. New York: Elsevier.
Piaget, J. 1962. Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. New York: Norton.
Piaget, J. 1965. Wisdom and the Misconceptions of Philosophy. Belgrade: Nolit.
Poerksen, B. 2003. "At each and every moment, I can decide who I am: Heinz von
Foerster on the observer, dialogic life, and a constructivist philosophy of distinctions".
Cybernetics & Human Knowing 10(3-4): 9 – 26.
Poincaré, H. 1905. Science and Hypothesis. London: Walter Scott Publishing.
Popper, K. 1969. "Rationality of scientific revolutions". In I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
(eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 51 – 58.
Pribram, K.H. 1971. Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and Principles in
Neuropychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Riegler, A. 2001. "Towards a radical constructivist understanding of science"
Foundations of Science 6(1 - 3): 1 - 30.
Romesin, H.M. 2002. "Autopoiesis, structural coupling and cognition: A history of these
and other notions in the biology of cognition". Cybernetics and Human Knowing 9(34): 5 – 34.
Saint-Exupery, A.D. 1946. The Little Prince. Fort Washington, PA: Harvest.
Schopenhauer, A. 1840. The World as Will and Representation. Bristol: Longman.
Schrödinger, E. 1944. What is Life?; Mind and Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Thyssen, O. 2003. "TRUTH IS WAR: Conversations with Heinz von Foerster".
Cybernetics and Human Knowing 10(3-4):179 – 181.
Uskoković, V., Košak, A., and Drofenik M. 2006. "Preparation of silica-coated
Lanthanum-Strontium manganite particles with designable Curie point, for

35
application in hyperthermia treatments". International Journal of Applied Ceramic
Technology 3(2): 134 – 143.
Uskoković, V. 2008a. Isn't self-assembly a misnomer? Multi-disciplinary arguments in
favor of co-assembly". Advances in Colloid and Interface Science 141(1-2): 37 - 47.
Uskoković, V. 2008b. "Of sustainability, elephants and prefab sprouts". International
Journal of Sustainable Society 1(1): 85 – 102.
Uskoković, V. 2009a. "Challenges for the modern science in its descend towards nano
scale". Current Nanoscience 5(3): 372 – 389.
Uskoković, V. 2009b. "On science of metaphors and the nature of systemic reasoning".
World Futures: Journal of General Evolution 65: 241 – 269.
Uskoković, V. 2009c. "On the light doves and learning on mistakes". Axiomathes: An
International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 19: 17 - 50.
Uskoković, V. 2009d. Sketches of Stars and Pearls of Wisdom: Essays on Human Heart
and the Divine Ethics. Scotts Calley, CA: CreateSpace.
Uskoković, V. 2010a. "Major challenges for the modern chemistry in particular and
science in general". Foundations of Science 15 (4): 303 – 344.
Uskoković, V. 2010b. "The metaphorical model: The bridge between science and
religion". Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science 6: 11 – 34.
Varela, F., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. 1991. The Embodied Mind (Cognitive Science
and Human Experience). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ward, K. 2003. God: A Guide for the Perplexed. Oxford: Oneworld.
Weischedel, W. 1966. The Backdoor Entrance to Philosophy. Belgrade: Plato.
White, L. 1949. The Science of Culture. Clinton Corners, NY: Percheron Press.
Whitehead, A. N. 1925. Science and the Modern World. Belgrade: Nolit.
Winograd, T. and Flores, F. 1987. Understanding Computers and Cognition. Norwood,
NJ: Ablex.
Witten, D. and Rinpoche, A.T. 1998. Enlightened Management. London: Rider.
Wittgenstein, L. 1918. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by C. K. Ogden. New
York: Dover
Wittgenstein, L. 1951. On Certainty. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von
Wright. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.

36
Železnikar, A.P. 1990. On the Way to Information 1. Ljubljana: The Slovene Society
Informatika.

Author's address
Therapeutic Micro and Nanotechnology Laboratory
Department of Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences
University of California, San Francisco
1700 4th Street, San Francisco, CA 94158-2330
Vuk.Uskokovic@ucsf.edu

About the author
Vuk Uskoković is presently a professional researcher in the Department of
Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences at the University of California, San Francisco.
While his main research efforts lie in biomedical applications of nanotechnologies, he
has had a lifelong interest in cognitive sciences and the philosophy of constructivism.
Besides dozens of publications in the field of biomaterials and nanotechnologies, he is
most excited about his recent works released in philosophical and cognitive science
journals (e.g., Foundations of Science, Technoetic Arts, World Futures, Pragmatics and
Cognition), including his online issued books (uskokovic.yolasite.org) that express his
philosophical ideas in a reader-friendly transdisciplinary manner, and hopes to continue
his contribution to the world of philosophical thought.

